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On July 5, 2003, less than 4
months after the first cases of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
were recognized, the World Health
Organization (WHO) declared that the
global epidemic had been contained.
Although the United States was not as
severely affected by the SARS epi-
demic as parts of Asia and Canada,
the outbreak response demonstrated
both known and unexpected strengths
and weaknesses in U.S. national,
state, and local public health and
healthcare capacities to address major
infectious disease challenges.
Although whether SARS will reap-
pear is unknown, the public health
and healthcare communities must be
prepared for the possibility. As part of
the preparedness and response plan-
ning process, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) con-
vened a meeting August 12–13, 2003,
in Atlanta.
The meeting had approximately
100 participants, including 30 exter-
nal partners from international,
national, state, and local agencies.
The purpose of the meeting was to
share experiences and lessons learned
from the response to the SARS out-
break, describe anticipated needs in
preparation for the possible reemer-
gence of SARS, discuss SARS pre-
paredness and response plans current-
ly under development, and outline
priority areas and roles of various
partners in ensuring adequate pre-
paredness at the national, state, and
local level.
Two plenary sessions and a break-
out session were held. The speakers in
the first plenary outlined several key
lessons learned during the outbreak
response: 1) although some clinical
features are suggestive of SARS, its
symptoms overlap too much with
those of other respiratory pathogens to
make a clinical diagnosis; 2) risk of
exposure is key to considering the
likelihood of a diagnosis of SARS;
3) prompt use of isolation and infec-
tion control procedures was a key and
effective part of SARS control;
4) quarantine was an integral part of
SARS control in some settings with
extensive transmission; and 5) testing
multiple specimens (e.g., respiratory
secretions, stool, and serum or plasma)
may improve our ability to detect
SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-
CoV) infection.
The speakers also described U.S.
national, state, and local perspectives
on SARS preparedness planning.
They emphasized the need to inte-
grate SARS preparedness planning
with other preparedness efforts, such
as those for pandemic influenza and
bioterrorism, and to address legal,
policy, and authority issues in
responding to public health emergen-
cies like SARS. The importance of
international collaboration and coop-
eration in responding to an outbreak
such as SARS and preparing for its
possible return was also emphasized.
The speakers in the second plena-
ry session highlighted the following
lessons learned at the federal, provin-
cial, and local levels during the SARS
outbreak in Toronto, Canada: 1) pub-
lic health units need flexible and
robust surveillance and information
technology systems to handle data-
collection needs and facilitate rapid
reporting of disease activity across
and within multiple jurisdictions;
2) isolation and quarantine measures
are acceptable if appropriately
explained, but it is important to
address issues of identification and
tracking of contacts, to monitor
potential contacts for noncompliance,
and to provide them with social and
economic support; 3) public health
programs and hospitals require exten-
sive expertise, resources, and good
training to strengthen infection con-
trol practices; 4) laboratories should
develop standard protocols and
agreements regarding specimen and
data sharing and ownership; and 5)
accurate and timely dissemination of
information are critical and should be
tailored to the needs of specific
groups, be easily accessible, and be
culturally and linguistically appro-
priate.
Following the first plenary session,
participants were divided into five
workgroups to cover the following
components of the SARS prepared-
ness and response plans: 1) surveil-
lance and information technology;
2) community preparedness and
response (including isolation and
quarantine); 3) healthcare prepared-
ness; 4) laboratory; and 5) communi-
cations and education. Each work-
group was asked to define the key
issues or needs for an effective
response to SARS, preparedness
activities that should be begun imme-
diately, and the roles of federal, state,
and local agencies and hospitals in
these efforts. During the second ple-
nary, each workgroup presented a
summary of their discussions to the
larger group of participants.
For surveillance, a flexible and
functional response plan is needed
that could be adapted to the various
stages of a SARS epidemic and that
integrates infection control activities
both within hospitals and in the com-
munity. Key preparedness activities
include educating healthcare workers
about the diagnosis of SARS and
developing guidelines for identifica-
tion, reporting, and laboratory evalua-
tion of potential SARS case-patients.
Establishing an efficient data manage-
ment system that links clinical, epi-
demiologic, and laboratory data and
allows rapid sharing of critical and
pertinent information was identified
as a high priority.
For community response, guide-
lines should address issues of isola-
tion and quarantine of SARS patients
and their contacts, including consider-
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ation of facilities for isolation (hospi-
tal, residential, other) and mecha-
nisms of enforcement. The guidelines
should be flexible and allow state or
local officials to use their knowledge
of local circumstances and judgment
to determine which measures are most
applicable. Successful implementa-
tion of containment measures will
depend on public trust and require a
consistent and clear communications
plan. Groups that will be instrumental
in implementing an effective
response, such as the transportation
industry, law enforcement, emergency
services, and federal, state, and local
legal experts, should be engaged early
in the planning process. Training
modules and drills that utilize realistic
scenarios to evaluate the decision-
making process and assess the feasi-
bility of implementing containment
measures should be developed, tested,
and disseminated.
For healthcare preparedness, key
considerations include defining infec-
tion control precautions for evaluating
and handling patients with respiratory
illness in the outpatient and inpatient
setting, educating and training clini-
cians on clinical features of SARS and
appropriate use of personal protective
equipment, and building strong part-
nerships and collaborations between
the clinical and public health commu-
nities, including cross-training staff in
the areas of infection control and pub-
lic health. Furthermore, issues of
resource allocation and surge capacity
in the event of a major SARS epidem-
ic should be addressed.
For laboratory preparedness,
guidelines should be updated for spec-
imen collection, transport, and storage
and the appropriate use of diagnostic
tests and interpretation of test results.
Surge capacity for testing at the feder-
al, state, and local levels should be
identified, and an adequate supply of
reagents that have been properly vali-
dated and checked for quality should
be ensured. While research to develop
second-generation assays for
improved diagnosis of SARS-CoV
infection should continue, efforts
should also focus on improving the
performance of existing assays.
Biosafety recommendations for speci-
men collection and laboratory process-
ing must be updated. Guidelines for
environmental testing for SARS-CoV
must be developed and should include
information on the role and utility of
testing.
For communications and educa-
tion, messages and curricula should
be developed that target three audi-
ences: public (including policy mak-
ers), physicians, and public health
workers. Materials that were devel-
oped in response to the SARS out-
break must be reviewed and updated.
Education and training efforts should
focus on key areas, such as recogniz-
ing the clinical manifestations of
SARS, appropriate use of infection
control practices and personal protec-
tive equipment, rationale and practical
guidance for implementing isolation
and quarantine, and appropriate use
and interpretation of laboratory diag-
nostic tests.
The information and ideas shared
in this meeting are helping the public
health and healthcare communities
define priority SARS preparedness
activities at the national, state, and
local levels.
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Correction, Vol. 10, No. 1
In the article "Bacillus anthracis Incident, Kameido, Tokyo, 1993" by
Hiroshi Takahashi, et al., errors occurred in the 4th paragraph under
"Discussion" on page 119: mu symbols were inadvertently replaced by the let-
ter "m." The corrected sentences appear below:
The human respiratory infectious dose 50 (dose that will produce an infec-
tion in 50% of exposed persons) is unknown but has been estimated to be
8,000 to 10,000 spore-bearing particles <5 µm in diameter (7). Kameido res-
idents described a gelatinous substance, suggesting the suspension would be
poorly dispersed and droplets would be too large to form particles <5 µm in
diameter.
In addition, the name of the lead author of this article is misspelled in the
table of contents of this issue. In the table of contents, the article should be
attributed to "H. Takahashi et al."
The corrected article appears online at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/
vol10no1/03-0238.htm
We regret any confusion these errors may have caused.